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Abstract
This paper focuses on the dimensions shaping the dynamics of technology. We present a model 
where the knowledge stock of a country grows over time as a function of three main factors: 
its innovation intensity, its technological infrastructures and its human capital. The latter two 
variables contribute to determine the absorptive capacity of a country as well as its innovative 
ability. Based on this theoretical framework, we carry out an empirical analysis that investigates 
the dynamics of technology in a large sample of developed and developing economies in the last 
two-decade period, and studies its relationships with the growth of income per capita in a dyna-
mic panel model setting. The results indicate that the cross-country distributions of technological 
infrastructures and human capital have experienced a process of convergence, whereas the inno-
vative intensity is characterized by increasing polarization between rich and poor economies. 
Thus, while the conditions for catching up have generally improved, the increasing innovation 
gap represents a major factor behind the observed differences in income per capita.
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Closing the Technology Gap?
 

1. Introduction 
A recent body of research in applied growth theory focuses on the is-
sue of cross-country heterogeneity, and points out the great diversity 
of countries’ characteristics and growth behaviour. The study of the 
variety of economic growth patterns across countries does now consti-
tute a central research theme in growth empirics (Temple, 1999; Is-
lam, 2003; Durlauf et al., 2005). 
 
One strand of research in this tradition has in particular studied the 
evolution of the world income distribution and pointed out the exis-
tence of increasing polarization between the club of rich and the group 
of poor countries (Quah, 1996a; 1996b; 1996c; 1997). Empirical 
analyses investigating the so-called emerging twin-peaks in the world 
distribution of income have flourished rapidly in the last decade (Bi-
anchi, 1997; Jones, 1997; Paap and van Dijk, 1998; Anderson, 2004). 
 
What are the factors that may explain these empirical findings on clus-
tering and income polarization? One major explanation, recently pro-
posed by growth models in the technology-gap (or distance-to-
frontier) tradition, points to innovation and the international diffusion 
of new technologies as the possible sources of income polarization 
and convergence clubs (Papageorgiou, 2002; Howitt and Mayer-
Foulkes, 2005; Stokke, 2008).1 More specifically, technology-gap 
models argue that two main dimensions determine the ability of a 
country to catch up. The first is its absorptive capacity, i.e. its ability 
to imitate foreign advanced technologies. The second is its innovative 
capability, namely the extent to which the country is able to produce 
new advanced knowledge.  
 
While the importance of absorptive capacity and innovative ability for 
the growth process is widely acknowledged in modelling exercises, 
the empirical literature has not yet achieved a systematic understand-
ing of how these two dimensions evolve over time, and how the tech-
nological dynamics is related to the evolution of the world distribution 
of income. 
 
                                                 
1  The idea that technology is a major factor to explain cross-country differences in growth 
performance is also supported by a growing number of empirical works (e.g. Hall and 
Jones, 1999; Easterly and Levine, 2001). Overviews of the literature on technology and 
convergence have been presented by Fagerberg (1994), Islam (1999) and Gong and Keller 
(2003). 
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This paper carries out an empirical study that has two interrelated ob-
jectives. First, it investigates the dynamics of technology by focusing 
on the evolution of innovative activities and absorptive capacity, con-
sidering a large sample of countries in the last two-decade period. Se-
condly, it studies the link between technological and economic dy-
namics. By analysing the evolution of the world distribution of tech-
nological capabilities, we may thus investigate the extent to which 
technology is an important factor to explain the pattern of increasing 
income polarization and emerging twin-peaks, and identify the tech-
nology dimensions that are more closely related to the dynamics of 
GDP per capita.  
 
We first present a simple model where the technology dynamics of a 
country depends on three main factors: its innovative intensity, its 
human capital and its technological infrastructures. The latter two fac-
tors are assumed to shape the dynamics of both, the country’s absorp-
tive capacity and the productivity of its R&D sector. The model is the-
refore rooted in the technology-gap tradition. However, differently 
from the standard formulation where absorptive capacity only depends 
on human capital (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; 2005), our model adds 
a new dimension by pointing out the importance of technological in-
frastructures for the catching up process. 
 
Our empirical analysis of this model proceeds in three steps. First, we 
employ a set of indicators to measure the three technology dimensions 
pointed out by the model, and carry out a hierarchical cluster analysis 
that explores the existence of various groups of countries differing in 
terms of their levels of technological development. The results of the 
cluster analysis show the existence of three technology clubs with 
strikingly different technological characteristics and, relatedly, two 
large technology gaps separating these country groups. Secondly, we 
shift the focus to the study of the dynamics of these technology clubs, 
and make use of four different notions of technological convergence. 
Two of them are the well-known concepts of -convergence and -
convergence. The other two are new notions of convergence that we 
put forward in order to refine these standard definitions. The first re-
finement (Q-convergence) is based on the estimation of quantile re-
gressions for different percentiles of the conditional distributions of 
the technology growth rate, while the second (cluster convergence) is 
based on the analysis of the dynamics of the technology gaps over 
time. Finally, the third step of our empirical analysis is to investigate 
the implications of this technology dynamics for the growth of GDP 
per capita, and to estimate our technology-gap model in a dynamic 
panel model setting for the period 1970-2000.  
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The empirical results indicate that the cross-country distributions of 
human capital and technological infrastructures have experienced a 
process of convergence, while the evolution of innovative intensity is 
characterized by increasing polarization between rich and poor coun-
tries. Thus, while the conditions for catching up have generally im-
proved, the increasing innovation gap represents a major factor behind 
the observed differences in income per capita.  
2. The model  
The simple model presented in this section provides the theoretical 
framework of the paper. It focuses on technology as a major growth 
factor, and analyses the channels through which the dynamics of tech-
nology fosters the dynamics of income per capita. The growth of the 
knowledge stock of country i (Ai) is the sum of two components, 
knowledge creation (KCi) and knowledge imitation (KIi): 
 
ΔAi/Ai = KCi + KIi                                                                             (1) 
 
The knowledge imitation term is driven by the dynamics of the inter-
national diffusion of technologies. In line with previous technology-
gap models (e.g. Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994 and 2005; Papageor-
giou, 2002; Galor, 2005; Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes, 2005; Stokke, 
2008), we assume that knowledge imitation (KIi) depends on two fac-
tors: the technological distance from the frontier (GAPi), which pro-
vides opportunities for catching up through the imitation of foreign 
advanced technologies, and the absorptive capacity (δi), which affects 
the extent to which these imitation opportunities are exploited by each 
country: 
 
KIi=GAPiβ δi                                                                                        (2) 
 
The next equation endogeneizes absorptive capacity. The latter is as-
sumed to depend on two related factors, human capital (HKi) and 
technological infrastructures (TIi): 
 
δi=TIiδ1·HKiδ2                                                                                       (3) 
 
The human capital component (HKi) is the one that is commonly em-
phasized in technology-gap growth models. Besides, we argue that a 
second important factor affecting the absorptive capacity of a nation is 
its level of technological infrastructures (TIi). This is technology that 
is embodied in the infrastructures that support productive activities 
and that enables the communication between economic agents. When 
new technologies are produced, they are progressively used to im-
prove the infrastructures of the economy, and this has the effect of in-
creasing the efficiency of production in all industrial sectors that make 
use of these infrastructures.2 Technological infrastructures represent 
                                                 
2  For instance, in previous decades, the discovery and wide diffusion of GPTs such as te-
lephony and electricity have greatly enhanced the interrelatedness and the connections 
among firms, as well as their productive efficiency. More recently, innovations based on 
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therefore a crucial factor affecting the absorptive capacity of a coun-
try. Human skills would in fact be useless without the possibility of 
agents to communicate with each other and without the support of a 
well-functioning network of industrial infrastructure.3  
 
The other component affecting the growth of the knowledge stock of 
country i (Ai) is represented by the knowledge creation term (KCi). 
We model this as: 
 
KCi=INNiα·θi                                                                                       (4) 
 
The first term in this equation (INNi) symbolizes the innovative inten-
sity of a country. This refers to both, formalized R&D activities un-
dertaken by profit-motivated firms as well as scientific activities car-
ried out by the public research sector. The extent to which innovative 
activities do effectively lead to the creation of new advanced knowl-
edge depends on the productivity of the research sector, represented 
by the second term of the equation (θi). We endogeneize the produc-
tivity of the R&D sector by means of the following formulation: 
 
θi=TIiθ1·HKiθ2                                                                                       (5) 
 
Equation 5 assumes that the term θi depends on both human capital 
and technological infrastructures. This formulation argues that these 
two factors do not only have an impact on the ability of a country to 
imitate foreign advanced technologies by enhancing its absorptive ca-
pacity, but they are also important dimensions in the knowledge crea-
tion process (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Papageorgiou, 2002).  
Taking logs of equations 2 and 4 and plugging them into 1, the growth 
of the knowledge stock of country i can be rewritten as: 
 
ΔAi/Ai = α logINNi + (θ1+δ1) logTIi + (θ2+δ2) logHKi + β logGAPi   (6) 
 
Equation 6 highlights the four major factors determining the dynamics 
of the knowledge stock in our model. The first term is the intensity of 
the innovative effort undertaken by the country’s R&D sector. The 
second is the level of technological infrastructures, which has an ef-
fect on both knowledge creation and imitation (measured by the pa-
rameters θ1 and δ1 respectively). The third term is the human capital 
level, which does also have an effect on both knowledge creation and 
                                                 
ICTs (e.g. mobile telephony, Internet) have dramatically increased the network capabili-
ties of economic agents. 
3  The multiplicative form employed in equation 3 indicates that HK and TI are assumed to 
have an interaction effect on absorptive capacity. To illustrate this idea, the availability of 
advanced human skills may increase the possibility to make a more productive use of ad-
vanced technological infrastructures such as the Internet; in turn, Internet and ICT-based 
networks may enhance the access to data and information, thus benefiting more educated 
workers. 
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imitation (parameters θ2 and δ2). Finally, the fourth term is the tech-
nology-gap, which provides a potential for exploiting foreign ad-
vanced technologies. In sum, equation 6 provides a rather general 
formulation that refines previous technology-gap models by adding 
technological infrastructures to human capital as the major factors af-
fecting the related processes of knowledge imitation and production.4  
 
We can now derive the implications of the knowledge stock dynamics 
for economic growth in a standard growth accounting framework. The 
aggregate production function (expressed in per worker term) is: 
 
yi=Ai·kiγ                                                                                               (7) 
 
where yi is the GDP per worker of country i,  Ai is its knowledge stock 
and ki is the level of physical capital per worker. The growth of GDP 
per worker over time is: 
 
Δyi/yi=ΔAi/Ai+Δkiγ/kiγ                                                                        (8) 
 
Since the second term represents the investment rate (INVi), we re-
write equation 8 as: 
 
Δyi/yi = α logINNi + a logTIi + b logHKi + β logGAPi + γ INVi       (9) 
 
where a = (θ1 + δ1) and b = (θ2 + δ2). The first four terms represent the 
factors driving the growth of technological knowledge pointed out 
above, while the last one indicates the process of physical capital ac-
cumulation. This growth accounting equation constitutes the basic 
framework for the empirical analysis that will be presented in the fol-
lowing sections. Sections 3 and 4 will focus on the first three terms on 
the right-hand side of equation 9, in order to analyse the patterns and 
dynamics of technological change in the world economy in the last 
two- decade period. Section 5 will then consider the whole equation 
and explore the empirical relationship between the dynamics of tech-
nology and the growth of income per capita. 
 
                                                 
4  In the special case where θ1 = δ1= 0, we are back to the standard formulation where it is 
only human capital that enters the knowledge imitation and creation functions (e.g. Ben-
habib and Spiegel, 1994). 
3. Data, indicators and descriptive 
analysis  
The model presented in the previous section highlights three main di-
mensions of the process of technological accumulation: innovative 
intensity (INN), technological infrastructures (TI) and human capital 
(HK). This section presents a set of indicators and some descriptive 
evidence on these three technology dimensions. We consider a cross-
country sample constituted by 131 developed and developing econo-
mies for the period 1985-2004.5 For each aspect, we make use of the 
following indicators. 
Indicators of innovative intensity (INNOV):6 
 Patents: Number of patents registered at the US Patent and 
Trademark Office per million people (source: USPTO, 2004).  
 Scientific articles: Number of scientific and technical journal arti-
cles per million people (source: World Bank, 2006). 
Indicators of (new and old) technological infrastructures (TI): 
 Internet penetration: Number of Internet users per thousand peo-
ple (source: World Bank, 2006). 
 Mobile telephony: Number of mobile phone subscribers per thou-
sand people (source: World Bank, 2006). 
 Fixed Telephony: Number of telephone mainlines per thousand 
people (source: World Bank, 2006). 
 Electricity: Number of kilowatt of electricity consumed per hour 
per capita (source: World Bank, 2006).  
                                                 
5  For some of the indicators, data for a large sample of countries are only available for a 
slightly shorter period. The precise time span for each indicator is indicated as follows. 
Patents: 1985-2003; Scientific articles: 1986-2001; Internet: 1994-2004; Mobile teleph-
ony: 1993-2003; Fixed telephony: 1985-2003; Electricity consumption: 1985-2003; Terti-
ary enrolment ratio: 1991-2003; Higher schooling: 1980-2000; Secondary enrolment ra-
tio: 1991-2003; Total schooling: 1980-2000; Primary enrolment ratio: 1980-2000; Liter-
acy rate: 1990-2004.  
6  In addition to those presented here, R&D would have been another useful indicator of 
innovative intensity. However, it has not been used here because its country coverage is 
much more limited than it is the case for the other two innovation variables. 
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Indicators of (advanced and basic) human capital (HK):7 
 World Tertiary enrolment ratio: Share of tertiary students (source: 
Bank, 2006).  
 Years of higher schooling: Average number of years of higher 
education in the population over 15 (source: Barro and Lee, 2001). 
 Secondary enrolment ratio: Share of secondary students (source: 
Barro and Lee, 2001). 
 Years of total schooling: Average number of years of school com-
pleted in the population over 15 (source: Barro and Lee, 2001). 
 Primary enrolment ratio: Share of primary students (source: Barro 
and Lee, 2001).  
 Literacy rate: Percentage of people over 14 who can, with under-
standing, read and write a short, simple statement on their every-
day life (source: World Bank, 2006).  
 
The advantage of using a large number of indicators is that we are 
able to provide a more multifaceted description of countries’ techno-
logical level than if we were using one single indirect measure such as 
their total factor productivity (TFP). This is particularly important in a 
large sample that includes countries characterized by very different 
levels of technological and economic development.88 While the main 
interest of our empirical analysis is to investigate the dynamics of 
technology in this large sample of countries, it is useful to start by 
providing a general idea of the extent of cross-country differences in 
the level of technology.  
 
We do this by means of a cluster analysis, whose purpose is to explore 
the existence of groups of countries characterized by different techno-
logical capabilities. The exercise follows a hierarchical cluster meth-
odology, which is a clustering technique able to find out endogenously 
the most appropriate number of country groups. The main result of 
this exercise is that three well distinct technology clubs emerge robus-
tly from the cluster analysis.9 The major characteristics of these coun-
                                                 
7  For each aspect considered here (tertiary, secondary and basic education), we have chosen 
to use two different indicators, one referring to the period 1980-2000 (source: Barro and 
Lee, 2001), and the other to the period 1990-2004 (source: World Bank, 2006). This 
makes it possible to check the robustness of our empirical results, so to ensure that they 
do not depend on the time span available for each indicator. 
8  Relatedly, one possible disadvantage of using a large number of indicators is that some of 
them also reflect other aspects of the development process like consumption and invest-
ment patterns, as it is for instance the case for our indicators of fixed and mobile teleph-
ony, electricity and education levels. This limitation is, however, not easy to overcome, 
since indicators that try to measure a complex concept such as the one of absorptive ca-
pacity are inevitably closely related to a country’s overall level of development and, 
hence, to a broad set of other aspects of an economic, institutional and social nature.   
9  The cluster analysis has carefully analysed the robustness of these results by experiment-
ing with different input variables and different clustering methods. The exercise has also 
been repeated at the beginning and the end of the period to assess the stability of the re-
sults over time. The three-cluster pattern that is presented here is robust to these modifica-
tions.   
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try clubs are presented in table 1 and Appendix 1, and they are briefly 
described as follows. 
 
Cluster 1: Advanced. This is the group of more technologically ad-
vanced countries, composed by a small set of industrialized econo-
mies: the traditional leaders, US and Japan, Continental and Northern 
European economies, and Western offshoots (Australia, Canada, Israel 
and New Zealand). Table 1 shows that at the beginning of the period 
the group is characterized by high innovative intensity (on average, 
around 62 patents and 644 scientific articles per million people), well-
developed technological infrastructures (in terms of both old and new 
infrastructures), and high levels of basic and advanced education (over 
42% tertiary enrolment ratio, more than 9 years of total schooling, and 
nearly 99% literacy rate).  
 
Cluster 2: Followers. This is a larger group composed by around 70 
countries. The core of this technology club is constituted by catching-
up economies from Asia, the South of Europe, the Middle East and 
Latin America. Compared to the advanced cluster, this group shows a 
much lower innovative intensity. In fact, table 1 indicates that at the 
beginning of the period the innovation gap between the advanced and 
the followers group is quite huge (nearly 16:1 for patents, 10:1 for ar-
ticles). Over the period, the technological distance has gradually de-
creased, although the innovation gap vis-à-vis the economies in the 
advanced cluster does remain considerable. On the other hand, the 
technological distance between this second group and the more ad-
vanced one is significantly lower in terms of technological infrastruc-
tures and education levels, and the gap has significantly diminished 
during the last two decades.  
 
Cluster 3: Marginalized. This is the largest group of countries, mainly 
constituted by large Asian economies plus many African countries. In 
terms of innovative intensity, this group is not only remarkably far 
from the technological frontier, but also quite distant from the fol-
lower countries in the second cluster. Table 1 shows in fact that at the 
beginning of the period the technological distance between the fol-
lowers and the marginalized groups is around 273:1 in terms of pat-
ents and 19:1 for scientific articles. Regarding the indicators of tech-
nological infrastructures and human capital, the distance vis-à-vis the 
followers cluster at the beginning of the period is also remarkable, al-
though the gap has gradually diminished during the period. 
 
In short, this empirical description indicates that the first group is rich 
in terms of both innovative ability and absorptive capacity; the mid-
dle-income group has a lower ability to innovate; and the less devel-
oped group does also lag behind in terms of absorptive capacity. 
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These results point out the existence of two large technology gaps. 
The first refers to the great distance that separates the group of follow-
ers from the technological frontier, particularly with respect to innova-
tive activities. The second refers to the huge gap that separates the 
marginalized from the followers clubs, both in terms of innovative 
intensity and of infrastructures and human capital.  
 
Table 1. Main characteristics of the three technology clubs, beginning 
(t0) and end (t1) of the period 
 
  Cluster 1:  Advanced  Cluster 2: Followers Cluster 3: Marginalized 
  t0  t1 
t0 
 t1 
t0 
 t1 
 
 
Patents 
 61.89 116.12 3.90 9.16 0.01 0.02 
INN 
 
 
Scientific 
articles 
 
644.8 791.4 67.6 110.4 3.6 5.3 
 
Internet  
users  
 
51.9 613.8 4.7 225.1 0.0 32.1 
TI 
Mobile  
telephony 
 
49.0 
 
799.2 
 
6.5 
 
444.5 
 
0.2 
 
70.2 
 
 
Fixed  
telephony 
 
429.4 
 
597.1 
 
123.7 
 
262.7 
 
8.3 
 
38.2 
 
 Electricity   
9290.6 
 
12107.9 
 
2626.8 
 
3672.9 
 
223.7 
 
395.8 
 
 
Tertiary  
enrolment 
ratio 
 
42.2 66.5 24.4 40.8 4.2 8.2 
 
Years of  
higher 
schooling 
 
0.46 
 
0.75 
 
0.17 
 
0.40 
 
0.03 
 
0.08 
 
HK 
Secondary  
enrolment 
ratio 
98.3 119.1 75.4 90.3 29.7 45.1 
 
 
Years of  
total schoo-
ling 
 
9.3 10.4 6.1 7.1 2.5 3.5 
 
Primary  
enrolment 
ratio 
5.63 5.87 4.04 4.64 1.95 2.81 
 
 
Literacy rate 
 
98.5 98.9 91.3 94.3 51.6 63.3 
Notes: The list of countries included in each cluster is reported in Appendix 1.
4. The dynamics of technology 
How have these technology gaps evolved in the last two-decade pe-
riod? This section considers this question by investigating the dynam-
ics of technology over the period 1985-2004. In line with our theoreti-
cal framework, the three dimensions that we look at are innovative 
intensity (INN), technological infrastructures (TI) and human capital 
(HK). Since there exists no prior theory or model indicating how these 
three dimensions evolve over time, our analysis of technological dy-
namics follows a simple empirical strategy.  
 
We carry out a standard analysis of (unconditional) convergence for 
each of these three factors, and study how their statistical distributions 
have evolved in the last two decades. For each dimension, a pattern of 
convergence would indicate that a process of technological catching 
up is in place, meaning that less developed economies have experi-
enced a more rapid technological dynamics than industrialized coun-
tries. By contrast, a finding of divergence would indicate the presence 
of a cumulative mechanism that is leading to increasing disparities 
between rich and poor countries.10    
 
The analysis proceeds by considering four different notions of con-
vergence. Two of them, -convergence and -convergence, are well 
known and widely used in applied growth theory. In addition, we put 
forward two new concepts of convergence, Q-convergence and cluster 
convergence, which represent refinements of the standard definitions, 
and which make it possible to shed new light on the evolution of the 
world distribution of technological activities. 
4.1 -convergence and Q-convergence 
We start by considering the standard notion of -convergence. For 
each of the three technology dimensions, the dependent variable is the 
(average annual) growth of technology over the period 1985-2004, 
while the level of the same indicator at the beginning of the period is 
the only regressor. The cross-country regression model is: 
 
ΔAi/Ai=τA + AAi,0 + i                                                                      (10) 
                                                 
10  In other words, the (unconditional) convergence analysis presented in this section does 
not assume or test any theoretical convergence model. By contrast, in the absence of a 
theoretical framework suggesting how these three technological dimensions precisely 
evolve, our empirical analysis simply aims at measuring the direction and rate of change 
of their dynamics, without relating them to any other possible explanatory factor. 
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where ΔAi/Ai is the growth of each technology dimension (i.e. 
ΔHKi/HKi; ΔTIi/TIi; ΔINNi/INNi) of country i over the period, and 
Ai,0  is the log of its level at the beginning of the period (i.e. HKi,0; 
TIi,0; INNi,0). The parameter of interest in these regressions is A, 
which measures the speed of convergence for each of the three dimen-
sions of technology (i.e. Hk, TI and INN).  
 
The first column of table 2 reports these estimated  coefficients, 
which turn out to be negative in all the regressions. All indicators sug-
gest therefore a pattern of -convergence in technology. The speed of 
convergence is rapid for ICTs infrastructures (Internet: 6,6%; mobile 
telephony: 6%), less so for the indicators of primary and secondary 
education levels (around 2%), and significantly slower for innovative 
activities, traditional infrastructures and advanced education (all lower 
than 1%).  
 
The notion of -convergence provides a simple and intuitive idea of 
the growth behaviour of the average of the distribution of the technol-
ogy indicators, but it tells nothing about the evolution of the whole 
distribution over time. As such, it is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for convergence (Quah, 1993). It is thus important to look at 
the convergence pattern also from a different perspective. 
 
We thus propose a refinement of the notion of -convergence and de-
fine it Q-convergence. The idea is to study -convergence by estimat-
ing a set of quantile regressions instead of one single ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression as customary in the convergence literature. 
While an OLS regression estimates the conditional mean function, 
providing an idea of the behaviour of the average of the distribution, a 
quantile regression estimates a conditional quantile (percentile) func-
tion, and thus enables an analysis of the behaviour of different parts of 
the distribution, including the tails (Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Koen-
ker and Hallock, 2001).  
 
In our study of cross-country technological dynamics, Q-convergence 
is investigated by running a set of j quantile regressions for each of the 
three dimensions of technology: 
 
(ΔAi/Ai)j = τAj + AAi,0j + ij                                                              (11) 
 
where j is the jth quantile of the technology dimension (HK, TI and 
INN, respectively), i.e. the jth percentile of the conditional growth dis-
tribution of each technology indicator. In other words, for each indica-
tor, we estimate j cross-country regressions, each of which measures 
the speed of -convergence in technology at a different quantile of the 
growth distribution. Q-convergence is investigated by looking at the 
Closing the Technology Gap?  17 
vector j, where the j different components of the vector are the co-
efficients j estimated from the quantile regressions specified above. 
By looking at different percentiles of the conditional growth distribu-
tion, Q-convergence provides a more complete characterization of the 
dynamics of technological convergence than the simple notion of -
convergence is able to do. 
 
The results for our technology indicators are presented on the right-
hand side of table 2, where, for each indicator, we report the estimated 
vector j corresponding to the 20th, 40th, 60th and 80th quantiles of its 
conditional growth distribution. For all of the indicators, the results 
show that the  coefficient differs substantially across the distribution. 
In general terms, the speed of convergence is much greater (smaller) 
at upper (lower) quantiles. Besides, for the variables measuring inno-
vative intensity (patents and scientific articles) the estimated  coeffi-
cient has a positive sign in correspondence to the lower part of the dis-
tribution, indicating technological divergence.  
 
The interpretation of this finding is the following. The regressions that 
refer to the upper quantiles of the conditional growth distribution fo-
cus on the countries that have been particularly dynamic in the period, 
i.e. those economies whose growth rate of technology has been faster 
than it could have been expected based on their initial level of tech-
nology. These regressions investigate therefore the convergence hy-
pothesis by focusing on the well-performing countries at different lev-
els of development, including the fast-growing developing economies 
(e.g. China), the industrialized countries catching up with the techno-
logical frontier (e.g. Asian NICs), and the most dynamic leaders. 
Analogously, the regressions referring to the lower quantiles of the 
conditional growth distribution analyse the convergence hypothesis 
for the low-performing countries in the sample, i.e. for the economies 
whose technological performance has been more sluggish than it 
could have been expected based on their income level at the beginning 
of the period, including marginalized economies falling behind as well 
as slow-growing industrialized and rich countries.  
 
The results presented in table 2 indicate that when we focus on the 
upper quantiles of the conditional growth distribution we observe a 
rapid process of technological convergence, meaning that a few fast-
growing developing economies have been able to develop more rap-
idly than the other (richer) well-performing countries in the sample. 
This suggests that a process of technological catching up is at stake. 
However, the key point is that technological convergence is by no 
means a characterizing feature of the whole sample. When we focus 
on the lower quantiles of the distribution, low-performing poor coun-
tries have in some cases not been able to develop their technological 
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capabilities more rapidly than industrialized and rich low-performing 
economies. This is particularly evident for the indicators of innovative 
intensity, where we indeed observe technological divergence. This 
suggests that, in this part of the conditional growth distribution, a pro-
cess of increasing disparities between developed and less developed 
economies has been at stake. 
 
Table 2. -convergence and Q-convergence in technology, 1985-2004 
 
   -convergence  
    
  Q-convergence    
   20
th quantile 
 
40th quantile 
 
60th quantile 
 
80th quantile 
 
       
 Patents  -0.26% +0.19% -0.15% -0.42% -0.54% 
INN Scientific  
articles 
 
-0.06% +0.65% +0.38% -0.22% -0.56% 
 
 
Internet  
users  
 
-6.60% -5.50% -6.43% -7.04% -7.31% 
TI 
Mobile  
telephony 
 
-5.97% 
 
-5.08% 
 
-5.84% 
 
-6.77% 
 
-8.00% 
 
 
Fixed  
telephony 
 
-0.80% 
 
-0.20% 
 
-0.77% 
 
-1.20% 
 
-1.82% 
 
 Electricity   
-0.33% 
 
-0.36% 
 
-0.19% 
 
-0.28% 
 
-0.38% 
 
 
 
Tertiary  
enrolment ratio 
 
-0.72% 0.00% -0.75% -0.84% -1.43% 
 
Years of  
higher schooling 
 
-0.87% 
 
-0.49% 
 
-0.86% 
 
-1.15% 
 
-1.51% 
 
HK 
Secondary  
enrolment ratio -2.00% -1.56% -2.22% -2.47% -2.77% 
 
 
Years of  
total schooling 
 
-1.03% 0.00% -1.02% -1.19% -1.45% 
 Primary  enrolment ratio -1.60% -1.28% -1.60% -1.72% -1.79% 
 
 
Literacy rate 
 
-2.12% -1.61% -1.89% -2.44% -3.03% 
 
Notes: The first column reports the -convergence coefficient estimated from OLS regression 10. 
The other four columns report the coefficients of convergence j estimated from quantile regres-
sions 11, where j is the jth percentile of the conditional distribution of the growth rate of each 
technology indicator.  
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4.2 -convergence and cluster convergence 
The idea of -convergence is to study whether the dispersion of a tar-
get variable has increased or decreased over time, thus providing a 
synthetic measure of the dynamics of the variability of its distribu-
tion.11 Table 3 presents the results of the analysis of -convergence 
for our technology indicators. The first two columns report the coeffi-
cient of variation of each indicator at the beginning and at the end of 
the period, and the third column presents its rate of change over the 
period, which represents a synthetic measure of -convergence. The 
table indicates that all of the technology variables are characterised by 
decreasing dispersion over time. The speed of -convergence is par-
ticularly rapid for the indicators of ICTs infrastructures (Internet and 
mobile telephony, more than 50%). The variables measuring tradi-
tional infrastructures, education levels and innovative activities have 
also experienced a decrease in the cross-country dispersion. However, 
the coefficient of variation shows that the variability across countries 
is still large at the end of the period, particularly in terms of innovative 
intensity. These -convergence results are in line with the findings of 
the - and Q-convergence analysis presented above, and suggest that, 
in general terms, the evolution of the world distribution of technologi-
cal activities has been characterized by an overall pattern of conver-
gence over the last two decades, although different groups of countries 
have experienced distinct dynamics of technological change. In order 
to look more specifically at the behaviour and relative dynamics of 
different groups of countries, we propose a second refinement of the 
convergence concept.  
 
The concept of cluster convergence that we introduce here develops 
naturally from the results of the cluster analysis presented in section 3, 
which have pointed out the existence of three technology clubs. A ge-
neral definition of cluster convergence may be the following: Given a 
statistical distribution partitioned into k clusters, cluster convergence 
arises when the centre of a group gets closer to the centre of the upper 
cluster over time. For our technology clubs, we therefore observe clus-
ter convergence if the centre of the followers (marginalized) cluster 
has come closer to the centre of the advanced (followers) club, i.e. if 
the technological distance between them has diminished over the pe-
riod. This notion refines the one of -convergence because it enables 
to investigate whether the observed decrease in the dispersion of the 
technology indicators has been determined by a rapid catching up of 
the followers vis-à-vis the technological frontier, or by a rapid catch-
ing up of the marginalized vis-à-vis the followers, or by both of them.  
 
                                                 
11  The notion of -convergence has increasingly been used in applied growth theory in re-
cent years, and it has constituted the basis for developing new methods for analysing the 
evolution of the world distribution of income over time (Quah, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c). 
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The results of the cluster convergence analysis are presented on the 
right-hand side of table 3. The table shows that the club of followers 
has on average decreased its technological distance from the advanced 
group for all the dimensions of technology considered here. This 
catching up process has been remarkably rapid in terms of Internet 
users and mobile telephony, reflecting the worldwide diffusion of 
ICTs. It has also been quite dynamic with respect to innovative activi-
ties, which is precisely the aspect where the technology gap between 
the followers and the advanced clubs was more evident at the begin-
ning of the period (see section 3). 
 
When we turn the attention to the dynamics of the marginalized vis-à-
vis the followers club, however, the picture is different. Here, conver-
gence is rapid in terms of ICTs infrastructures, and less so for the in-
dicators of traditional infrastructures (electricity) and education. On 
the other hand, the innovation gap between the marginalized and the 
followers clubs has significantly increased (patents: +35.7%; scientific 
articles: +10.5%), indicating that the group of marginalized economies 
has not yet been able to intensify its innovative efforts, while the other 
two groups have been much more dynamic in this respect. This is in 
line with the finding of the Q-convergence analysis, which suggests 
the existence of divergence and increasing polarization at the lower 
quantiles of the distributions of these two indicators.12 
 
                                                 
12  Note that this result is not affected by the fact that a few fast catching up economies (e.g. 
China, Asian NICs) have passed from the lower to the upper cluster over time. In the ana-
lysis of cluster convergence, in fact, these few dynamic shifting-cluster economies (listed 
in Appendix 1) have not been considered as part of the upper cluster. If they had been in-
cluded in the latter, they would have decreased the centre of the lower cluster and, hence, 
they would have biased the evidence in favour of divergence between the two clubs. In 
other words, the analysis of cluster convergence requires that the cluster composition 
must be held constant over the investigation period. 
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Table 3. -convergence and cluster convergence in technology, 1985-2004 
 
 
   -convergence  
 
     Cluster convergence 
 
 
 
 
 
Coefficient 
of variation 
in t0 
 
 
Coefficient 
of variation 
in t1 
 
Rate of 
change 
Advanced 
vs. 
Followers 
 
Followers 
vs. 
Marginalized 
  
Patents 
 
3.08 2.65 -13.8% -20.1% +35.7% 
INN Scientific  
articles 
 
2.14 
 
1.93 
 
-9.8% 
 
-24.8% 
 
+10.5% 
 
  
Internet  
users  
 
2.66 1.20 -54.9% -75.4% -92.6% 
TI 
Mobile  
telephony 
 
2.25 
 
1.04 
 
-53.6% 
 
-76.2% 
 
-79.6% 
 
 
Fixed  
telephony 
 
1.36 
 
1.05 
 
-22.5% 
 
-34.5% 
 
-54.1% 
 
 Electricity   
1.46 
 
1.41 
 
-3.8% 
 
-6.8% 
 
-21.0% 
 
 
 
Tertiary  
enrolment ratio 
 
0.89 0.80 -9.9% -5.7% -15.1% 
 
Years of  
higher schooling 
 
1.18 
 
0.90 
 
-23.5% 
 
-31.6% 
 
-7.4% 
 
HK 
Secondary  
enrolment ratio 0.56 0.44 -21.0% +1.3% -21.0% 
 
 
Years of  
total schooling 
 
0.55 0.47 -15.1% -3.0% -16.6% 
 Primary  enrolment ratio 0.53 0.39 -26.6% -9.1% -20.3% 
 
 
Literacy rate 
 
0.33 0.26 -23.6% -2.8% -15.7% 
 
Notes: The first two columns report the coefficient of variation at the beginning and at the end 
of the period respectively (the coefficient of variation is defined as the standard deviation 
divided by the mean). The third column shows the rate of change of the coefficient of varia-
tion over time, which is a measure of -convergence in the period 1985-2004. The fourth 
(fifth) column reports the rate of change of the technology gap between the advanced (follow-
ers) and followers (marginalized) clubs. These rates of change represent our measure of clus-
ter convergence, and have been calculated by comparing the levels of the technology gaps at 
the beginning and at the end of the period. 
5. The link between technological and 
income dynamics 
The findings of the previous section indicate that the group of indica-
tors that have experienced the most rapid pace of technological con-
vergence are those measuring ICT-related infrastructures, i.e. Internet 
and mobile telephony, while more traditional infrastructures (electric-
ity and fixed telephony) have been converging at a much slower pace. 
The world distribution of human capital is also characterized by an 
overall process of convergence, although the speed of convergence 
has been faster for the indicators of basic education (primary and sec-
ondary schooling) than for those measuring tertiary education. By 
contrast, the other important dimension of technology outlined in the 
model, the innovative intensity, has experienced a different dynamics, 
since middle-income countries have been able to partly close the tech-
nology gap, while the group of less developed economies has not. 
With respect to this dimension, we therefore observe increasing po-
larization between rich and poor countries, and the progressive catch-
ing up (or vanishing) of the middle-income group.   
 
This dynamics resembles closely what Quah (1996a; 1996b; 1996c; 
1997) called emerging twin-peaks. Quah’s well-known empirical re-
sult refers however to the evolution of the cross-country distribution 
of income, rather than the dynamics of technology. This leads to pose 
one relevant question: what is the relationship between the dynamics 
of technology and the growth of income, and what are the dimensions 
of technology that are most closely related to economic growth? We 
analyse this question by means of two conclusive exercises. 
 
The first is to repeat the convergence analysis undertaken in the previ-
ous section by focusing on the dynamics of GDP per capita in the pe-
riod 1985-2004. Tables 4 and 5 present the results of the four conver-
gence tests that have been used to analyse technological convergence 
in section 4, namely the -, Q-, - and cluster-convergence tests. The 
results indicate that, differently from most of the technology indica-
tors, income per capita has been characterized by an overall pattern of 
divergence, where poor countries have not in general been able to 
grow more rapidly than richer economies (see table 4). In addition, the 
cross-country variability of the distribution has increased by about 
9%, and this has mainly been due to the increasing income gap be-
tween marginalized economies and the rest of the world (see table 5). 
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These findings show that, even when we focus on a more recent pe-
riod than Quah did, the emerging twin-peaks pattern is still evident.  
The key point for our analysis is therefore that the evolution of the 
world income distribution in the last two decades has followed a pat-
tern very similar to that experienced by the dynamics of innovative 
activities, since both of them are characterized by increasing polariza-
tion between rich and poor countries.13  
 
Table 4. -convergence and Q-convergence tests for the GDP per ca-
pita, 1985-2004  
 
 
-convergence 
 
              Q-convergence   
 20
th quantile 
 
40th quantile 
 
60th quantile 
 
80th quantile 
 
 
+0.19% 
 
+0.62% +0.41% +0.19% -0.34% 
 
Table 5. -convergence and cluster convergence tests for the GDP 
per capita, 1985-2004 
 
 
-convergence  
 
           Cluster conver-
gence 
 
 
 
Coefficient of 
variation in t0 
 
 
Coefficient of 
variation in t1 
 
Rate of 
change 
 
Advanced 
vs. 
Followers 
 
Followers 
vs. 
Marginalized 
 
0.99 
 
1.08 +8.8% -2.9% +9.4% 
 
The second exercise that we carry out in order to study the relation-
ship between the dynamics of technology and the growth of GDP per 
capita is to analyse the link between the former and the latter in a 
panel model setting. We do this by estimating equation 9 (see section 
2), which decomposes the growth of GDP per capita into the sum of 
                                                 
13  This result is consistent with the recent empirical study of Feyrer (2008), which has iden-
tified a close relationship between the evolution of the world income distribution and the 
dynamics of TFP. 
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the dynamics of technology and the rate of physical capital accumula-
tion. The empirical version of this growth accounting equation is:14 
 
Δyi/yi =γ INVi + α logINNi+a logTIi+b logHKi+β logyi–β logyL    (12) 
 
where yL is the GDP per capita of the leader country (hence the last 
two terms of the equation correspond to the term logGAPi of equation 
9). In a panel data setting, where a full set of country-specific and 
time-specific effects can be added to the set of explanatory variables, 
equation 12 can be written as:  
 
logyi,t =  (1 + β) logyi,t-1 + γ INVi,t-1 + α logINNi,t-1 + a logTIi,t-1 + b 
logHKi,t-1 + ηi + µt – β logyL,t-1 + εi,t                                                  (13) 
 
where ηi represents the set of country-specific effects and µt  is the 
time-specific component. We may also define (µt – β logyL,t-1) = ρt 
since these two terms are invariant across countries and can both be 
accounted for in the set of time dummies.  
 
By first differencing equation 13, we eliminate the country-specific 
effect ηi and obtain the growth equation specified in first differences: 
 
Δlogyi,t =  (1 + β) Δlogyi,t-1 + γ ΔINVi,t-1 + α ΔlogINNi,t-1 + a ΔlogTIi,t-1 
+ b ΔlogHKi,t-1 + Δρt + Δεi,t                                                             (14) 
 
Equation 14 is the empirical counterpart (in panel form) of the re-
duced form equation of our technology-gap model (see equation 9 in 
section 2). In line with our theoretical framework, the dynamic panel 
specification relates the growth of GDP per capita of country i to the 
dynamics of the following main explanatory variables: (1) the lagged 
level of the dependent variable15; (2) the investment rate; (3) the in-
tensity of innovative activities; (4) the level of technological infra-
structures; (5) the human capital level. As presented in section 2, the 
last two factors are assumed to have an impact on both the absorptive 
capacity and the productivity of the R&D sector, thus affecting at the 
same time the imitation capability and the innovation ability of a 
country.16 All technology-related variables are measured by means of 
the indicators presented and analysed in sections 3 and 4. The invest-
                                                 
14  For a related growth accounting exercise in a standard cross-country OLS framework, see 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994). For more general presentations and discussions of the 
growth accounting methodology, see Easterly and Levine (2001) and Caselli (2005). 
15  Note that since the ß coefficient is usually expected to be negative (in the presence of 
cross-country convergence), when the growth equation is specified as in equation (14) the 
estimated coefficient is instead expected to be positive (and smaller than 1, in the pres-
ence of convergence). This expectation is also in line with the stationarity condition (see 
the panel unit root tests reported in the bottom part of table 6). 
16  Recall in fact the parameter definitions previously set out in section 2: a = (θ1 + δ1); b = 
(θ2 + δ2). 
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ment indicator is measured as capital investment as a share of GDP 
per capita, and the latter is in log form (both variables are from the 
Penn-World Tables, version 6.1).  
 
As compared to the standard OLS cross-country regression frame-
work, the dynamic panel specification presents two advantages. First, 
by including a full set of country-specific effects among the regres-
sors, the fixed-effects specification overcomes the omitted variable 
bias that arises in the presence of cross-country heterogeneity (Islam, 
1995). Secondly, the dynamic model specification takes into account 
the possible endogeneity of the explanatory variables (Caselli et al., 
1996). A common strategy in the panel approach to growth empirics is 
to employ Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator, which treats all 
the regressors as endogenous variables and uses their lagged levels as 
instruments for the lagged first differences. This is the method we use 
to estimate equation 14. As customary in the panel growth approach, 
all the variables are averages over 5-year periods. Since one of the 
variables (scientific articles) is only available for a shorter time span, 
we consider two different estimation periods. The longer one is 1970-
2000 (composed of six 5-year periods), whereas the shorter time span 
refers to 1985-2000 (three 5-year periods).17  
 
Table 6 presents the estimation results. The tests reported in the lower 
part of the table confirm the validity of the instruments (Sargan test) 
and the absence of second-order autocorrelation. The bottom of table 
presents the results of three panel unit root tests (Levin-Lin-Chu, Im-
Pesaran-Shin, and Fisher), which all reject the null hypothesis of non-
stationarity of the GDP per capita series. 
 
The upper part of table 6 reports the estimation results. The lagged 
GDP per capita variable, as expected, has a positive and significant 
estimated coefficient, which in the context of our technology-gap 
model is interpreted as evidence of a catching up mechanism linked to 
the international diffusion of advanced technologies. The investment 
variable is also positive and significant in the estimations, confirming 
the important role of the process of physical capital accumulation for 
economic growth. 
 
Innovative activities are measured by means of two variables, the pat-
ent indicator and the scientific articles variable (the latter available 
only for the shorter time span). Both of them turn out to be positively 
                                                 
17  It should be noticed that, while the advantage of the panel dataset is to exploit the time 
series variation in the cross-country dataset, the common disadvantage is that most of the 
variables are only available in panel form for a somewhat more limited sample of coun-
tries. The panel regression results presented here do in fact refer to a sample of around 70 
economies, which is smaller than the whole cross-country sample that was used in the 
previous sections. 
Fulvio Castellacci 26 
related to the dynamics of income per capita, and their estimated coef-
ficients are significant and quite stable throughout the regressions. 
This result is in line with the convergence analysis previously pre-
sented, which has shown that the dynamics of both innovative activi-
ties and GDP per capita is characterized by increasing polarization 
between rich and poor countries and the gradual catching up (or van-
ishing) of the middle-income group. Our model interprets this empiri-
cal pattern as evidence of the important role played by innovative ac-
tivities for economic dynamics, and as an indication that one major 
reason behind the increasing income disparities in the world economy 
is related to cross-country differences in the intensity of innovative 
efforts.   
 
The next four variables measure the role of human capital (secondary 
and higher education) and technological infrastructures (electricity 
and fixed telephony18). One of these indicators, the electricity vari-
able, is highly correlated to the other measures of human capital and 
infrastructures, thus leading to a problem of multicollinearity in the 
regressions. For this reason, we also report the results of regressions 
that do not include the electricity variable, and which are therefore 
able to estimate with greater precision the effect of the other regres-
sors (see columns 1, 3, 4 and 6).  
 
The two variables measuring human capital are positive and signifi-
cant in most of these experiments. The higher education variable, in 
particular, appears to have a stronger impact on income per capita in 
the shorter than in the longer period. Interestingly, while previous ana-
lyses frequently failed to identify a positive and significant relation-
ship between human capital and growth (see discussions in Benhabib 
and Spiegel, 1994, and Pritchett, 2001), our finding suggests that more 
advanced education levels are indeed correlated with economic 
growth in the last two-decade period in a panel data setting, and that 
tertiary education is progressively becoming a more crucial aspect to 
explain cross-country differences in economic performance. 
 
The two indicators of technological infrastructures, electricity and fix-
ed telephony, are also positive and significant (see columns 2, 3, 5 and 
6). This provides support for the hypothesis pointed out by our theo-
retical model. Technological infrastructures matter for the growth and 
development process since they may contribute to strengthen the ab-
sorptive capacity of a country as well as the productivity of its re-
search activities. In fact, the regressions presented in columns 2, 3, 5 
and 6, which add technological infrastructures to human capital, pro-
                                                 
18  The indicators of ICT infrastructures considered in previous sections, mobile telephony 
and Internet, are available only for a shorter time span and cannot be used in a panel set-
ting as the other variables. We have therefore not been able to consider these ICT-related 
variables in the panel estimations. 
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vide evidence for this hypothesis and improve the standard formula-
tion based on human capital alone, which is the base specification te-
sted in columns 1 and 4 (e.g. Benhabib and Spiegel, 1984; Papageor-
giou, 2002). 
 
Summing up, the analysis undertaken in this section indicates that the 
world distribution of GDP per capita is characterized by increasing 
polarization between rich and poor economies, and that this dynamics 
is closely related to the following main factors: (1) the process of phy-
sical capital accumulation; (2) a catching up mechanism linked to the 
international diffusion of advanced technologies; (3) technological 
infrastructures and human capital, which can foster both the ability of 
a country to imitate foreign technologies and the productivity of its 
R&D sector; (4) the intensity of innovative activities.  
 
Our analysis of technological convergence in the previous section in-
dicates that, while the third factor (conditions supporting knowledge 
imitation and creation) is characterized by an overall process of cross-
country convergence, the fourth one has experienced divergence and a 
pattern of increasing polarization between rich and poor countries. In-
novative activities represent therefore a crucial dimension that devel-
oping economies should more actively upgrade and focus on during 
the catching up process. 
 
Fulvio Castellacci 28 
Table 6. Growth accounting regressions – Results of dynamic panel 
model estimation (Arellano-Bond GMM estimator) 
 
 
Longer period: 
panel 1970-2000 
 
 
 
 
        Shorter period: 
        panel 1985-2000 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
∆GDPPC 
 
0.7016 
(43.72)*** 
 
0.5384 
(21.71)*** 
 
0.5906 
(26.34)*** 
 
0.5602 
(50.97)*** 
 
0.4899 
(23.98)*** 
 
0.5377 
(27.87)*** 
∆INV 0.1732 (13.05)*** 
0.1196 
(7.52)*** 
0.1791 
(11.33)*** 
0.1789 
(14.38)*** 
0.1205 
(13.69)*** 
0.1584 
(11.00)*** 
∆INN  
(Patents) 
0.0434 
(13.98)*** 
0.0473 
(13.25)*** 
0.0591 
(25.20)*** 
0.0437 
(23.37)*** 
0.0248 
(6.07)*** 
0.0432 
(18.11)*** 
∆INN  
(Articles)    
0.0845 
(13.51)*** 
0.0616 
(8.18)*** 
0.0818 
(15.98)*** 
∆HK  
(Secondary)  
0.0022 
  (0.20) 
-0.0174 
   (1.19) 
0.0532 
(3.30)*** 
-0.0177 
  (1.28) 
-0.0349 
 (1.68)* 
0.0291 
(2.02)** 
∆HK 
(Higher) 
0.0463 
(5.89)*** 
-0.0342 
(4.68)*** 
0.0259 
  (1.64)* 
0.0565 
(6.56)*** 
-0.0609 
(5.44)*** 
0.0383 
  (5.94)*** 
∆TI 
(Electricity)  
0.1988 
(9.26)***   
0.2229 
(28.62)***  
∆TI 
(Telephony)  
0.0064 
  (2.04)** 
0.0144 
(11.23)***  
0.0055 
 (1.19) 
0.0079 
  (5.60)*** 
Constant 0.0089 (3.57)*** 
0.0102 
(3.42)*** 
0.0114 
(4.95)*** 
0.0144 
(4.65)*** 
0.0226 
 (7.67)*** 
0.0048 
   (1.57) 
Time dummies 
 
Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sargan test 68.12 55.60 57.59 56.87 55.64 56.09 
Autocorrelation 
(1) 
 
-3.83*** 
 
-3.76*** -3.86*** -2.73*** -2.63*** -2.73*** 
Autocorrelation 
(2) 0.36 1.34 0.50 -0.08 0.84 -0.15 
Wald χ2 
 
7626.69 
 
3641.37 19749.9 40926.7 27083.1 235256.8 
Countries 74 67 68 65 63 64 
Observations 
 
428 
 
339 342 184 177 180 
Panel unit root 
tests 
 
LLC (4) 
-4.41*** 
 
LLC (5) 
-5.37*** 
 
IPS (4) 
-5.24*** 
 
IPS (5) 
-6.30*** 
 
FT (4) 
-2.64*** 
 
FT (5) 
-3.44*** 
 
 
Notes: Arellano and Bond GMM two-step estimator. T-statistics between parentheses.  
*** Significance at 1% level; ** Significance at 5% level; * Significance at 10% level. 
The panel unit root tests have been carried out on the log GDP per capita series (yearly 
data) for the countries included in the regressions. All three tests (LLC: Levin-Lin-Chu; 
IPS: Im-Pesaran-Shin; FT: Fisher type test) include a constant and a time trend in the 
augmented Dickey Fuller equation. The number of lags have been selected based on the 
AIC (the numbers between parentheses indicate the maximum number of lags that have 
been considered for each test). 
6. Conclusions  
Countries in the world economy are characterized by remarkably dif-
ferent levels of technological development. The paper has shown that 
there exist, in particular, three distinct technology clubs. The technol-
ogy gaps that separate these country groups are large with respect to 
all the main dimensions of technology that have been considered by 
our theoretical model, namely human capital, technological infrastruc-
tures and innovative activities. This fact is relevant because, before 
implementing policies aimed at developing the knowledge base of a 
country, it is important to carefully assess its strengths and weak-
nesses, and its relative position vis-à-vis more advanced countries. 
Since countries can only imitate and adopt technologies that are ap-
propriate to their development level (Basu and Weil, 1998), technol-
ogy policies should also be appropriate and specifically targeted to a 
set of country-specific possibilities and objectives. Our findings sug-
gest, in particular, that the current emphasis on the need for develop-
ing countries to invest and rapidly adopt ICT-related infrastructures 
should be complemented by an equally great effort to build up and 
upgrade more traditional infrastructures.  
 
Notwithstanding the existence of large technology gaps, the empirical 
evidence on the technological dynamics across countries provides 
some encouraging indications. In the last couple of decades, less de-
veloped economies have in fact been able to partly close the large dis-
tance separating them from the other two groups in terms of both hu-
man capital and technological infrastructures. These two factors are 
important because they may contribute to strengthen a country’s ab-
sorptive capacity as well its innovative capability. The convergence 
pattern experienced by these two dimensions in the last two-decade 
period is crucial not only for the impacts it has had on the dynamics of 
income, but also because human skills and technological infrastruc-
tures constitute important aspects of welfare. In other words, they are 
not simply means to achieve economic progress, but do also constitute 
achievements that are directly relevant for human development, repre-
senting therefore important targets for policy. 
 
The dimension of technology where developing economies have not 
yet achieved considerable progress, and where they have actually ex-
perienced an increase in the technology gap, refers to the intensity of 
innovative activities. The latter dimension is in fact characterized by a 
process of increasing disparities between rich and poor economies, 
which closely resembles the evolution of the world income distribu-
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tion. Innovative activities represent therefore a crucial dimension that 
developing economies should more actively upgrade and focus on 
during the catching up process. 
 
In order to get closer and eventually jump to the innovation develop-
ment stage, developing economies should implement an appropriate 
combination of policies that takes into account the need to simultane-
ously develop R&D activities, traditional infrastructures, ICTs and 
advanced human skills. Referring to this latter aspect, our analysis has 
in fact shown that, as developing and middle-income countries get 
closer to the technological frontier, tertiary education becomes the 
most crucial aspect of human capital, while primary and secondary 
education progressively become less relevant factors to explain differ-
ences in economic performance across countries.  
 
In sum, the perspective adopted in this paper and the related empirical 
findings suggest that the interaction among different dimensions of 
technology constitutes a crucial factor of growth and catching up. Po-
licies aimed at closing the technology gap should therefore undertake 
an active effort to simultaneously build up and upgrade the various 
complementary aspects that constitute each country’s capability to 
imitate foreign technologies and its ability to create new advanced 
knowledge.   
 
 
Appendix 1: The composition of the 
technology clubs 
Cluster 1: Advanced: 
Japan, US, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, UK, Denmark, Fin-
land, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Is-
rael. 
 
Cluster 2: Followers: 
Honk Kong (↑), South Korea (↑), Singapore (↑), Malaysia, Philip-
pines, Thailand, Fiji, Austria (↑), Belgium (↑), France (↑), Luxem-
bourg, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, 
Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab 
Emirates, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Puerto Rico, Uruguay, Venezuela, South Africa, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Re-
public, Georgia, Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan 
 
Cluster 3: Marginalized: 
China (↑), Indonesia (↑), Vietnam (↑), Bangladesh, India, Mongolia, 
Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Iran (↑), Oman (↑), 
Yemen, Albania (↑), El Salvador (↑), Guyana (↑), Honduras (↑), Gua-
temala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Algeria (↑), Botswana (↑), Mauritius (↑), 
Tunisia (↑), Zimbabwe (↑), Benin, Cameroon, Central African Repub-
lic, Congo Rep., Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Leso-
tho, Madagascar, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia. 
 
Notes: The arrows indicate those countries shifting towards the upper cluster be-
tween the beginning and the end of the period. 
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